

## Message Text

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FOL RPTSTATE 010223 ACTION DAKAR LUSAKA ABIDJAN KINSHASA RABAT  
MONROVIA BANGUI LIBREVILLE NAIROBI YAOUNDE 15 JAN.

QUOTE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, AO, US

SUBJECT: EXCERPTS FROM SECRETARY JANUARY 14 PRESS  
CONFERENCE -- ANGOLA

1. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY:

THE UNITED STATES HOLDS THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, IF IT IS TO PROCEED TOWARDS A GENUINE EASING OF TENSIONS, IS THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL SEEK TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER, THAT RESTRAINT WILL GOVERN OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES, AND THAT NOTHING WILL BE DONE THAT COULD ESCALATE TENSE SITUATIONS INTO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

IT IS THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT THESE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF ABSTRACT GOOD WILL, THEY ARE AT THE VERY HEART OF HOW TWO RESPONSIBLE GREAT POWERS MUST CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR ERA.

IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT WHEN ONE GREAT POWER ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A SPECIAL POSITION OF INFLUENCE BASED ON MILITARY INTERVENTION AND IRRESPECTIVE OF ORIGINAL MOTIVES, THE OTHER POWER WILL SOONER OR LATER ACT TO OFFSET THIS

ADVANTAGE. BUT THIS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A CHAIN OF ACTION AND REACTION TYPICAL OF OTHER HISTORIC ERAS IN WHICH GREAT POWERS MANEUVERED FOR ADVANTAGE, ONLY TO FIND THEMSELVES SOONER OR LATER EMBROILED IN MAJOR UNCLASSIFIED

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CRISES AND INDEED IN OPEN CONFLICT.

IT IS PRECISELY THIS PATTERN THAT MUST BE BROKEN IF A LASTING EASING OF TENSIONS IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

WHATEVER JUSTIFICATION IN REAL OR ALLEGED REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE THE SOVIET UNION MAY CONSIDER TO HAVE HAD IN INTERVENING AND IN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE TOTALLY UNWARRANTED CUBAN INTRODUCTION OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE INTO ANGOLA, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY HISTORIC SOVIET OR RUSSIAN INTEREST IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT FOR ITSELF THAT IT CONSIDERS THE SOVIET MOVE IN ANGOLA AS RUNNING COUNTER TO THE CRUCIAL PRINCIPLES OF AVOIDANCE OF

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND SCRUPULOUS CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS WHICH WE HAVE JOINTLY ENUNCIATED.

THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS SUCH ACTIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A GENUINE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A WHOLLY UNNECESSARY SETBACK TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRENDS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH WE CANNOT BELIEVE IS ULTIMATELY IN THE SOVIET OR THE WORLD INTEREST.

THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF ANGOLA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY TO GO TO MOSCOW AND TO NEGOTIATE ON SALT. THERE ARE TWO POINTS THAT NEED TO BE MADE IN THIS CONTEXT.

FIRST, WE HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AS A FAVOR WE GRANT TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO BE TURNED ON AND OFF ACCORDING TO THE EBB AND FLOW OF OUR RELATIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CONTINUATION OF AN UNRESTRAINED STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WILL LEAD TO NEITHER A STRATEGIC NOR A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. IF THIS RACE CONTINUES, IT WILL HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF ALL OF HUMANITY.

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS THEREFORE A PERMANENT AND GLOBAL PROBLEM THAT CANNOT BE SUBORDINATED TO THE UNCLASSIFIED

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DAY-TO-DAY CHANGES IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES THAT IF TENSIONS INCREASE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP WILL DETERIORATE, AND THEREFORE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO BE AFFECTED.

SECOND, WE MUST CONSIDER THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LAPSES, THE SOVIETS WILL BE FREE OF SEVERAL SEVERE RESTRAINTS. THEY CAN ADD HEAVY ICBMS WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. THEY CAN BUILD MORE SUBMARINES WITHOUT DISMANTLING OLD ICBMS. THERE WILL BE NO EQUAL CEILING OF 2,400. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT WOULD BE THAT THE NUMERICAL GAP FROZEN IN SALT1, AND EQUALIZED IN VLADIVOSTOK, WOULD AGAIN BECOME A FACTOR, FACING US WITH THE CHOICE OF EITHER LARGE EXPENDITURES IN A STRATEGICALLY AND POLITICALLY UNPRODUCTIVE AREA OR A PERCEIVED INEQUALITY WITH ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

OF COURSE WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE ANY AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT ACHIEVE STRATEGIC EQUALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THAT WE CANNOT DEFEND AS BEING IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT ANGOLA, OR SIMILAR SITUATIONS,

WILL, IF CONTINUED, NOT IMPINGE ON SALT AS WELL AS THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF A MORE ORDERLY AND STABLE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WORLD, AND CANNOT BE EASILY ABANDONED. THIS IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT I SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW TO NEGOTIATE ON SALT, AND WE EXPECT THAT THE TALKS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE SAME SPIRIT BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU SAYING THAT YOU ARE MAKING SOVIET RESTRAINT IN ANGOLA A QUID PRO QUO FOR ANY SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE SALT TREATY, OR ARE YOU NOT SAYING THAT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I AM SAYING TWO THINGS: I AM SAYING THAT SOVIET ACTIONS IN ANGOLA, IF CONTINUED, ARE BOUND TO UNCLASSIFIED

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AFFECT THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES; THAT A SUBSTANTIAL DETERIORATION OF THAT RELATIONSHIP CAN ALSO OVER TIME AFFECT THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS.

AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, I WOULD ALSO MAINTAIN THAT THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS NOT A CONCESSION WE MAKE TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IT IS AN OBJECTIVE THAT IS IN OUR INTEREST, AND IT IS IN THE WORLD INTEREST, AND IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE. SO WE WILL PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK.

QUESTION: TO FOLLOW UP, IF THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON ANGOLA, WOULD YOU THEN EXPECT THAT THERE COULD BE A SUCCESSFUL SALT II NEGOTIATION LATER ON?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE WOULD HAVE TO FACE THIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY EXIST LATER.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE BEEN SENDING THIS MESSAGE, YOU AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE BEEN SENDING THIS MESSAGE TO MOSCOW NOW FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. HAVE YOU HAD ANY INDICATION WHATSOEVER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO ANGOLA, AND SECONDLY, ARE YOU WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE SOVIETS WHEN YOU GO TO MOSCOW?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT IS A CLOSE RACE BETWEEN THE MESSAGES WE SEND AND THE DETERIORATION OF OUR DOMESTIC POSITION. AND MESSAGES THAT ARE NOT BACKED UP AT HOME LOSE A FAIR AMOUNT OF THEIR CREDIBILITY.

WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANGOLA, AND WE HAVE HAD SOME EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ANGOLA IN RECENT WEEKS

WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO CLARIFY.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, I AM CURIOUS AS TO HOW YOU ARE GOING TO CONDUCT THESE PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. ON THE ONE HAND, YOU ARE INDICATING THAT THE SUCCESS OF SALT MAY HINGE ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU ARE GOING TO MOSCOW IN A FEW DAYS PRESUMABLY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. HOW CAN YOU DO THAT WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE SOVIET REACTION

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IN ANGOLA IS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE MADE CLEAR IN MY STATEMENT THAT THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT A BENEFIT WE CONFER ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS A GENERIC PROBLEM OF WORLD ORDER THAT MUST BE SETTLED AT SOME POINT AND FOR WHICH CONDITIONS ARE PROPITIOUS NOW BECAUSE OF A LONG RECORD OF NEGOTIATION, AND BECAUSE TECHNOLOGY IS AT A POINT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT CERTAIN RESTRAINTS NOW WHICH MIGHT THEN HAVE TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER CYCLE OF TECHNOLOGY BEFORE THEY CAN BE MADE EFFECTIVE.

THE POINT I AM MAKING IS THAT IF THERE IS A GENERAL DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, IT COULD AFFECT SALT. IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER IS AGREED IN MOSCOW WILL TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO NEGOTIATE IN GREATER DETAIL.

QUESTION: IF I COULD JUST FOLLOW UP FOR A SECOND, PLEASE -- IN OTHER WORDS, YOU ARE NOT SAYING, THEN, THAT IF THERE IS NOT SOME SOVIET PULL-BACK IN ANGOLA BEFORE THE TERMINATION OF YOUR TRIP TO MOSCOW, THAT THAT IS GOING TO HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON SALT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT IS CORRECT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT EXACTLY IS IT THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE SOVIETS TO DO IN ANGOLA? ARE YOU ASKING THEM TO TOTALLY CEASE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE MPLA? ARE YOU ASKING THEM TO GET THE CUBANS OUT OF THERE? OR WOULD YOU BE SATISFIED WITH SOMETHING LESS THAN THAT--THAT THEY, FOR EXAMPLE, MODERATE THE AMOUNT OF ARMS THAT THEY ARE SENDING AND TAKE SOME OF THE CUBANS OUT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, LET US GET SOME IDEA OF THE DIMENSIONS OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS DONE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS SENT CLOSE TO \$200 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ANGOLA IN THE LAST NINE MONTHS, WHICH EQUALS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ALL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SENT TO ALL THE REST OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY ALL OTHER COUNTRIES. SO THAT IS NOT A MINOR INFUSION OF MILITARY

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FORCE. IN ADDITION TO THAT, BETWEEN 5,000 AND 7,000 CUBAN MILITARY FORCES ARE IN CUBA -- ARE IN ANGOLA -- IN FACT, THEY SEEM TO BE EVERYWHERE EXCEPT INCUBA. THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTHERN FRONT IN ANGOLA IS CONDUCTED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY CUBAN FORCES AND WITHOUT EVEN A PRE-TENSE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MPLA PARTICIPATION. NOW, THAT IS A SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL EVENT FOR WHICH THERE ARE NO CLEVER EXPLANATIONS AND FROM WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES MUST

DRAW CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS.

AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, OUR POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE; THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. WE ARE EVEN PREPARED TO DISCUSS A PHASING BY WHICH SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FIRST, IF THERE IS A STATED, BRIEF INTERVAL AFTER WHICH ALL OTHER FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN; THAT THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MAIN FACTIONS; THAT ALL OUTSIDE POWERS, INCLUDING, OF COURSE, THE UNITED STATES, CEASE THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION. AND WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE END OF ALL MILITARY SHIPMENTS.

IF THE ISSUE COMES DOWN TO NOMINAL SHIPMENTS FOR A NORMAL GOVERNMENT BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, THIS IS SOMETHING ABOUT WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE.

WE WANT TO GET THE GREAT POWERS OUT OF ANGOLA. WE WANT TO RETURN IT AS AN AFRICAN PROBLEM. AND WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION THAT EMERGES OUT OF AFRICAN EFFORTS.

OUR CONCERN ABOUT ANGOLA IS THE DEMONSTRATION OF A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE WITH WHAT FOR THOSE CONDITIONS IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY INFUSION OF MILITARY FORCE-- PLUS AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE -- WHILE THE UNITED STATES PARALYZES ITSELF BY DECLARING A FRACTION OF THIS AS A MASSIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WHEN WE HAVE DECLARED THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR ADVISERS GOING THERE. AND THAT IS AN EVENT OF CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE BOTH THE SOVIET ACTION AND THE AMERICAN REACTION.

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QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, TO FOLLOW THAT UP, YOU SPOKE OF THE NEED TO BREAK THE PATTERN OF ACTION AND REACTION THAT COULD BUILD TOWARDS CRISIS. ISN'T THAT WHAT THE SENATE WAS TRYING TO DO, TO BREAK THAT PATTERN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, YOU CAN ALWAYS BREAK THE

PATTERN OF ACTION AND REACTION BY YIELDING. OUR IDEA IS TO MAINTAIN THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM -- NOT TO GIVE TEMPTATION FOR AGGRESSIVE AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION -- AND AT THE SAME TIME TO ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT. CERTAINLY IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS IN THE SHORT TERM BY DECLARING THAT THEY DO NOT EXIST.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND CONCLUSION OF A NEW SALT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS IF SOVIET AND CUBAN FORCES ARE STILL IN ANGOLA?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I AM GOING TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER THE DEADLOCK IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE BROKEN. WE SHOULD NOT PLAY WITH THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS A MATTER THAT IS OF PROFOUND CONCERN FOR THE LONG-TERM FUTURE. IT IS IN AN AREA IN WHICH NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES CAN BE ACHIEVED BY EITHER SIDE BUT IN WHICH THE MOMENTUM OF EVENTS CAN LEAD TO CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD BE VERY SERIOUS. AND THEREFORE WE WILL NOT USE IT LIGHTLY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES IN OTHER AREAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, OBVIOUSLY IF THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP DETERIORATES, THEN IT COULD OVER A PERIOD OF TIME EVEN AFFECT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. BUT I THINK WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID THAT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT WHAT THEY ARE DOING IN ANGOLA. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE OR WHAT ARE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS A LESSENING OR A DECREASE OF THEIR ROLE THERE THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO US?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE ARE EXPLORING WITH THE SOVIET UNION NOW WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN IN THE WAKE OF THE OAU UNCLASSIFIED

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MEETING, AND WE HAVE HAD SOME EXPLORATORY TALKS, SOME OF WHICH WOULD OFFER THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS. BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE MEANING THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO SOME OF THEIR IDEAS.

QUESTION: ONE FOLLOW-UP. IF THE SOVIET UNION WANTS THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OUT, WOULD THAT BRING ABOUT ITS DEPARTURE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT'S THEIR PROBLEM.

QUESTION: BUT YOU MUST HAVE AN OPINION.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK MAJOR POWERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO THINK ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES THEY WILL FACE WHEN

THEY ENGAGE THEIR TROOPS OR TROOPS OF THEIR FRIENDS. IT IS A LESSON WE HAVE HAD TO LEARN; IT MAY BE A LESSON THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD LEARN.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS ON ANGOLA. THERE HAVE BEEN TOTALLY CONTRADICTORY REPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET VESSELS OFF ANGOLA. U.S. OFFICIALS SAY THEY ARE THERE. THE SOVIET UNION SAYS THIS IS A TOTAL FABRICATION.

SECONDLY, THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU MEETING -- WHAT IS THE U.S. PERCEPTION OF WHETHER THAT HAS ENHANCED OR RETARDED THE PROSPECT OF A DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT FROM HERE ON?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THERE ARE SOME SOVIET VESSELS OFF ANGOLA -- OR AT LEAST THEY WERE YESTERDAY. I HAVEN'T SEEN TODAY'S REPORT. THERE WAS A CRUISER HEADING SOUTH, WHICH IS NOW IN PORT IN GUINEA. SO WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WILL CONTINUE TO HEAD SOUTH, OR WHETHER IT WILL MOVE TO ANOTHER DESTINATION. THAT WOULD BE THE LARGEST SOVIET VESSEL THAT HAS BEEN OFF SOUTHERN AFRICA IN MANY YEARS. BUT WE ARE NOT SURE YET WHETHER IT WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE SOUTH.

WHEN THE ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE MADE, IT WAS HEADING  
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SOUTH. IT HAS SINCE PUT IN AT THE PORT IN GUINEA. WHAT WAS YOUR OTHER QUESTION?

QUESTION: THE SOVIET UNION HAS DENIED THAT IT HAS ANY SHIPS THERE. WHERE DO YOU GO FROM THAT KIND OF A STAND-OFF?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, IF THERE ARE NO SHIPS THERE, AND IF WE SHOULD WAKE UP ONE MORNING AND FIND THERE ARE NO SHIPS THERE, WE WILL AGREE WITH THEM. AND THAT WILL END THE DEBATE. WE ARE NOT GOING TO PURSUE -- IT'S A GOOD WAY TO MAKE THE SHIPS DISAPPEAR.

QUESTION: THE SECOND POINT WAS YOUR PERCEPTION OF THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU MEETING. HAS THAT ADVANCED OR RETARDED THE DIPLOMATIC PROSPECTS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK, CONSIDERING EVENTS IN THIS COUNTRY IN RECENT WEEKS AND THE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE HAD TO GIVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO, CONSIDERING THE MASSIVE CUBAN AND SOVIET LOBBYING EFFORT THAT WENT ON AT THE OAU MEETING, IT IS REMARKABLE THAT HALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU SUBSTANTIALLY AGREED WITH OUR PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH IS TO SAY, NOT TO



RECOGNIZE ANY OF THE FACTIONS AND TO BRING ABOUT AN END OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

WE THINK, MOREOVER, THAT A VAST MAJORITY OF THE OAU MEMBERS FAVOR AN END OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION, IF ONE CAN SEPARATE THAT PROBLEM FROM SOME OF THE LOCAL ISSUES.

SO WE THINK THAT THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE MAIN LINES OF OUR POLICY, WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, TO LEAVE AFRICAN PROBLEMS TO THE AFRICAN NATIONS, AND TO IN-

SULATE AFRICA FROM GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION.

WE DO NOT WANT ANYTHING FOR THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE MPLA AS AN AFRICAN MOVEMENT. WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE MASSIVE FOREIGN INTERVENTION BY WHICH A VICTORY OF THE MPLA IS ATTEMPTED TO BE ACHIEVED.  
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SO I BELIEVE THAT THIS POSITION, WHICH IN ITS TOTALITY IS SUPPORTED BY, AFTER ALL, HALF OF THE AFRICAN STATES IN THE FACE OF MUCH DISCOURAGING NEWS FROM HERE, IS IN ITS MAJOR ELEMENTS SUPPORTED BY MORE THAN HALF OF THE AFRICAN STATES. AND WE HOPE THAT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION CAN BE BUILT ON THAT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, EARLIER YOU SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FAVOR A SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL EVEN IN ADVANCE OF WITHDRAWAL BY THE OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. CAN WE INFER FROM THIS THAT THERE'S BEEN SOME SORT OF WORK ON A TIMETABLE OR SOME COORDINATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA ABOUT ITS PRESENCE THERE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO. THE UNITED STATES FAVORS THE WITHDRAWAL UNCONDITIONALLY OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES -- SOUTH AFRICAN, CUBAN, SOVIET, AND WHATEVER OTHER FOREIGN FORCES COULD BE THERE.

THE UNITED STATES IN A GENERAL NEGOTIATION MIGHT EVEN -- COULD EVEN SUPPORT A PHASED WITHDRAWAL, AS LONG AS THE INTERVAL WERE SUFFICIENTLY SHORT AND IT IS NOT JUST AN EXCUSE TO PERMIT THE CUBANS TO TAKE OVER ALL OF ANGOLA, WHICH IS WHAT THE MILITARY FIGHTING IS NOW COMING DOWN TO IN ANGOLA. BUT THIS REFERS TO DIPLOMATIC POSSIBILITIES; IT DOES NOT REFER TO ANY UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND SOUTH AFRICA.

QUESTION: '76. WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN IN '76 INSOFAR AS A SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT? DO YOU THINK IN FACT THERE WILL BE A SALT AGREEMENT IN '76? AND HOW DO YOU THINK THE ANGOLA CRISIS WILL EVENTUALLY END? (LAUGHTER.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY NO-WIN QUESTION.

I THINK WE HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SALT AGREEMENT THAT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THAT, WITH A RATIONAL DEBATE IN WHICH THE ALTERNATIVES ARE CLEARLY PUT, CAN BE SOLD TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND TO THE AMERICAN CONGRESS.  
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AT ANY RATE, AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, WE WILL BE WORKING IN THAT DIRECTION.

I CANNOT SPEAK UNTIL I HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET POSITION;  
I CANNOT MAKE A FLAT PREDICTION.

WITH RESPECT TO ANGOLA, I THINK THE MAJOR POWERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SHOW GREAT RESTRAINT, AND I THINK THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO KEEP GREAT POWER RIVALRIES OUT OF THEIR CONTINENT AND HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY ALSO NOT TO PERMIT OUTSIDE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES TO BECOME THE DOMINANT EVENT. A GREATER DEGREE OF UNITY IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD HELP US ACHIEVE THIS

OBJECTIVE. AND UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS WE HAVE SEVERE DIFFICULTIES DUE TO OUR DOMESTIC SITUATION.

WITH RESPECT TO A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, WE OF COURSE SUPPORT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL ON THIS SUBJECT. SYRIA HAS DECLARED SO REPEATEDLY THAT IT WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ALONE, AND ONLY IN AN ARAB CONTEXT, THAT I WOULD THINK THAT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, WITHOUT INVOLVING SOME OTHER PARTIES, IS NOW LESS LIKELY THAN WOULD HAVE SEEMED THE CASE A FEW MONTHS AGO.

2. POSTS SHOULD DRAW UPON THE ABOVE IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS DIRECTED BY SEPTTEL.  
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